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Marcelo Vieta 
 
Technology: Curse or Promise? 
 
While it is true that for Herbert Marcuse “technology has the power and 
consequences Heidegger, Adorno, and Horkheimer, deplore,” it is also true that it held for 
him “a promise.”1 This makes his Critical Theory unique amongst both substantivist 
theorists of technology in general2 and his Frankfurt School contemporaries in particular. 
More significantly for those that are currently struggling for non-commodified modes of 
life, Marcuse’s proposals for a “post-technological rationality,” and even a “technological 
rationality of art,” promise to open up contemporary life to other, non-exploitative and less 
instrumentalized potentialities: what Marcuse views in One-Dimensional Man as pacified 
existence through new forms of technological mediations.3 Indeed, while it is true for 
Marcuse that our technological inheritance perversely captures and alienates late-modern 
life within a formalized rationality of exchange, instrumentality, and control, it is also true 
for him that this inheritance can be redeployed under other values in order to ground a 
project of human liberation from our struggles against scarcity, necessity, toil, and 
alienation. In other words, technology does not have to be guided by the values of 
neoliberalism, neoconservatism, exploitation, or profit; other, more communally sensitive 
and environmentally sound values can also legislate technological life.  
In this paper I seek to revisit Marcuse’s radical, dialectical, and materialist critique 
of technology in light of the other, more utopian side to his critique of technological 
rationality. My principle aim in doing so is to begin to reclaim his vision of a “post-
technological rationality”4 for a contemporary radical left politics. In the spirit of 
contributing to the overarching theme of the conference where I first presented these ideas, 
York University’s “Strategies of Critique: What’s Left? What’s Right” held in April 2008, 
in this paper I explore the emancipating potentiality left for today’s left for a more correct, 
                                                
1 Andrew Feenberg, Heidegger and Marcuse: The Catastrophe and Redemption of History (New York: 
Routledge, 2005), 98. 
2 For example: Martin Heidegger, Jacques Ellul, George Grant, Albert Borgmann, Hubert Dreyfus, etc. 
3 Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1964), 203-257. 
4 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 238. 
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and just—and right—philosophy and politics of technology in light of our current global 
neoliberal enclosures. While one can argue whether or not Marcuse’s utopian impulses 
running through his Critical Theory could ever ultimately open us up to new pathways for a 
new mode of technological existence (as I will lay out in this paper, I believe it can), social 
and political theorists concerned with critical social transformation should not overlook the 
fact that Marcuse did at least step up to the task of trying to think through—however 
provisionally—what it would take to forge another mode of civilization from our capitalist 
technological inheritance. It is this consistently utopian impulse that distinguishes Marcuse 
from his Frankfurt School contemporaries. It is an impulse that, far from ruling out 
Marcuse’s Critical Theory, instead validates his negative dialectics for a radical, concrete 
politics of technology. In this paper I ultimately begin to consider the efficaciousness of 
Marcuse’s Critical Theory of technology for the struggles against the technocratic and 
constituted forms of power facing our own times. 
Specifically, in the following pages I first very briefly present the substantivist 
critiques of technology exemplified by the negative side of Marcuse’s technology critique, 
in addition to Heidegger’s, Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s related critiques of technology 
(Marcuse’s main philosophical reference points on the theme). The substantivist critiques 
of technology expounded by Heidegger, Adorno, and Horkheimer, I will argue, while 
brilliant in their diagnostic force for unraveling the natural attitude of our time, tend to 
nevertheless lead towards resignation in our late-modern fate rather than offering concrete 
possibilities for the reform or transformation of the socio-technical sphere. I then explore 
Marcuse’s “other side” to his two-folded theory of technological rationality grounding his 
“ambivalence theory of technology,” laying out the more efficacious possibilities it offers 
us for re-valuing the technological base of advanced capitalist society within re-
materialized values of love, joy, refusal, and sensuousness. I will ultimately make the 
argument that as a conceptual framework for diagnosing and moving beyond today’s 
conjuncture of free market triumphalism, Marcuse helps us fundamentally see that our 
technology does not have to be guided by the values of productivism, ecological 
domination, total control, or profit. Underscoring the continued relevance of Marcuse’s 
analysis for today’s radical left, I conclude the paper by presenting six key historical-
conjunctural moments in Marcuse’s writings on technology that prefigure some 
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contemporary examples of technological liberation within the newest global social justice 
movements, examples that in many ways illustrate Marcusean-like re-rationalized 
technological re-appropriations by those struggling against global capital from below. 
 
Towards the “Completion of the Technological Project” 
For Marcuse, the struggle for another world within advanced industrialism and 
capitalism fundamentally requires us to think about how to eliminate painful forms of 
labour and the opening up of time to other and more pleasurable forms of life—free time, 
non-work time—by relegating necessary labour to technology, eradicating surplus labour 
and surplus repression, and, in turn, freeing up and reclaiming the spaces of life that Karl 
Marx called “disposable time,”5 or “the interval [of life situated] between the buying and 
the selling.”6 For Marcuse, the reappropriation of our technological inheritance for more 
liberating ends via more humane means would necessarily require technology’s 
reconciliation with both nature and human beings, which had both, under the thrall of 
progress and humanist-liberalist ideals, fallen perversely and irrationally under the control 
of its calculative and dominative logics. As Marcuse wrote in One-Dimensional Man: “If 
the completion of the technological project involves a break with the prevailing 
technological rationality, the break in turn depends on the continued existence of the 
technical base.”7  
The key to understanding Marcuse’s two-folded critique of technological rationality 
is to work out how he persistently argues for the need to change the very rationality that 
guides the technological apparatus of society and its ideology of the performance 
principle.8 According to philosopher of technology Andrew Feenberg, Marcuse’s two-
folded conceptualization of technology most fundamentally asks us to meditate on perhaps 
the two most important questions of our epoch: we must, for Marcuse, not only consider 
“the ontological question of what technology is making of us” (i.e., the primary concern of 
Heidegger, Adorno, and Horkheimer, for example), but also “ask the political question of 
                                                
5 Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations for the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft) (Harmondsworth, 
UK: Penguin Books, 1973), 706. 
6 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume 1 (New York: International Publishers, 1967), 
155. 
7 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 231. 
8 Feenberg, Heidegger and Marcuse,100. 
  
4 
what we can make of technology.”9 Beginning to explore the contemporary implications of 
this political question lies at the heart of this essay. 
 
Substantivist Views of Technology 
Substantivist critiques of technology extend Marx’s critiques of machinery, the 
factory, and the capitalist social forces of production to the entire lifeworld. Rather than 
only “the instruments of labour…employ[ing] the workman,” or the “machine mak[ing] use 
of [the worker]” instead of the worker the machine,10 today our entire lives—working life 
and leisure time—are subordinated to and employed by the capitalist technocratic 
imperative. For substantivists, the effects of this technocratic system is perhaps best 
encapsulated in a remark written by Horkheimer in his seminal 1937 essay “Traditional and 
Critical Theory”: “[T]he proposition that tools are prolongations of human organs can 
[now] be inverted to state that the organs are also prolongations of the tools.”11 In advanced 
industrial society, for Horkheimer, this meant that, saturated as it is with the artifices of 
human-made things, “unconscious nature” can no longer be distinguished from “the action 
of man in society,” “the marks of deliberate work.”12 
As such, substantivist theories—including the substantivist side to Marcuse’s 
diagnosis of technological rationality—argue that technology within late-modernity frames 
our values to such an extent that it “reveals” our epoch as distinguished by the fact that 
technology is no longer “mere instrumentality” but now “forms a culture of universal 
control.”13 Substantivists view technology as “essentially” reducing everything, and 
especially its very human users, to “functions and raw materials,”14 where the means (i.e., 
efficiency, productivity, and goal-oriented tasks) override the ends (i.e, all human values 
and meaning). For substantivist critiques, late-modern technological systems filter and 
shape reality, values, human instincts, experience, and life itself via technical mediations 
and calculative logics. Willfully driven and with no telos or objective realms of meaning 
                                                
9 Feenberg, Heidegger and Marcuse, 98. 
10 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume 1 (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co, 1906), 
461-2. 
11 Max Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, 188-243 (New 
York: Continuum 2002), 201. 
12 Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” 201. 
13 Andrew Feenberg, Questioning Technology (New York: Routledge, 1999), 2-3. 
14 Feenberg, Questioning Technology, viii. 
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left beyond the quantifiable—that is, framed by a humanist and situational individualism 
guided by what Horkheimer termed “subjective reason”15—techno-logy essentially 
“enframes”16 human beings within ordering thoughts and actions. In other words, 
technologies’ very logics and operational apparatuses now dominate us to the point where 
we have become mere cogs in the wheel of a masculinist-hued progressivist history. For 
Heidegger this had ontological implications, obscuring (or “concealing”) a more authentic 
revealing of Being. Adorno and Horkheimer took a class-based position in coming to terms 
with our historical fate, claiming that “[t]echnical rationality today is the rationality of 
domination [not necessarily due to] the internal laws of technology itself [but to its] 
function within the economy today.”17 
There is no doubt that a large part of Marcuse’s discussions of technology, such as 
the first half of Eros and Civilization and the first two-thirds of One-Dimensional Man, fall 
within such negative, substantivist critiques of our late-modern technological order.18 After 
all, the negative side to Marcuse’s critique of technological rationality was inspired, in no 
small way, by Heidegger (his doctoral teacher), György Lukács’s theories of reification, 
Max Weber’s analysis of modernity’s modes of formal rationality, and Marcuse’s Frankfurt 
School contemporaries.19  
While Marcuse would also agree that Heidegger’s notion of the “enframing” of 
Being or Adorno and Horkheimer’s instrumental capture of consciousness are 
characteristics of our modern technological destiny, for Marcuse modernity’s technocratic 
capture of humans and nature for instrumental ends is not as total as with Heidegger, 
                                                
15 Max Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason (New York: Continuum, 1974), 3. 
16 Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays, 3-35 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1977), 19. 
17 T.W. Adorno & Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2002), 95. 
18 In particular, Marcuse’s substantivist side to his Critical Theory of technology shows us how the 
technological rationality that permeates one-dimensional, advanced industrial societies is underpinned by a 
formal rationality that overrides the more objective, values-laden forms of reason distinguishing pre-industrial 
societies from industrial ones. Rather than being shaped by the two-dimensional and telos-formed logos and 
eros of the ancient Greeks (Marcuse’s model for the pinnacle of pre-modernist thinking in the West), reason 
today is framed by a “one-dimensional” rationality that stultifies and ossifies discourse and inner life within a 
logos of calculation, an ideology of the neutrality of machinic systems, social practices of repetition and 
sameness, and political systems driven by fear and tending towards total control. Moreover, Marcuse’s 
diagnosis shows us that, in practice, the systems and machines of control are not neutral but socially and 
politically inscribed in their very structures and applications. 
19 Andrew Feenberg & William Leiss, The Essential Marcuse: Selected Writings of Philosopher and Social 
Critic Herbert Marcuse (Boston: Beacon Press, 2007). 
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Adorno, or Horkheimer. Marcuse’s historically dialectic view of technology tends to 
ultimately retain a more hopeful view of its possibilities for cutting paths beyond our 
current technological condition.20 For Heidegger, Adorno, and Horkheimer, whatever 
promise might exist for a different, non-instrumentalized relation between the modern 
subject and nature seemed to rest with a deeper kind of philosophical contemplation 
unattainable for most of us mere mortals.21 For these three philosophers, a reflective 
disposition could somehow bracket-out our age’s natural attitude of instrumentalist reason 
and perhaps just begin to look beyond it to another kind of existence that would no longer 
only be about, according to Horkheimer, the “co-ordination of means and ends.”22 But it is 
not clear with these three philosophers how more mindfulness, remembrance, negation, 
free-relation, contemplation or sharper phenomenological attunement could help us come to 
reform technology in order to forge a non-instrumental existence. And while perhaps our 
age, as Horkheimer exclaimed in Eclipse of Reason, “needed no added stimulus to action” 
for fear of yet again instrumentalizing the “promises of philosophy,”23 the catastrophes 
unleashed throughout the 20th century surely require Critical Theory and the philosophy of 
technology to at least be involved in more sustained engagements with finding ways of 
transforming technologized society. Concrete reform of technical systems via thought alone 
remains a speculative proposition at best. 
 
Technology Under Another Form of Rationality 
In contrast to purely substantivist theories of technology, Marcuse believed our 
technological inheritance could be redeployed under other values rooted in another form of 
                                                
20 Marcuse shared Marx’s and Lukács’s ultimate faith in human beings’ continued capacities for cooperation, 
organization, and resistance. As with Marx and Lukács, for Marcuse, the attempt by the capitalist to deskill 
and dominate workers is never total. Some form of agency—akin to Marx’s “anthropogenesis,” or “man’s 
ability to create himself anew,” as Martin Jay writes (Martin Jay, The Dialectic Imagination: A History of the 
Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
1973), 57)—inevitably remains with human beings, even within capitalism’s tendencies for unbridled self-
expansion and capitalists’ zealousness for the commodification of all of life. 
21 Recall that, for Heidegger, all that one could hope for in the Gestell is a “free relation to technology”—
learning to live within its “danger” while awaiting a new dispensation within human reflection (Heidegger, 
“The Question,” 3-4, 25-36). Adorno and Horkheimer seem to also have had little hope in the possibility of 
any concrete civilizational change within advanced industrial society other than relying on a dialectically 
negative form of reason that may provision us with a capacity to achieve some sort of “remembrance of nature 
within the subject” by recapturing the tensions between the object’s appearance and the object’s potential 
beyond mere appearance (Adorno & Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 32). 
22 Horkheimer, Eclipse, 5. 
23 Horkheimer, Eclipse, 187. 
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rationality in order to ground a project of human liberation from the struggles against 
necessity and scarcity. For Marcuse, it is not technology per se which is the problem but an 
incomplete, stunted technology cleansed of its historical and materialist roots and shaped 
by a dominative, operationalist, and instrumentalized rationality that falsely deems this 
technological base to be a deterministically evolutionary given of “progress.” For Marcuse, 
it is the “project” of industrialization and the logic of a society administered diffusely that 
guides the technical. Once applied in this system, technology embodies the politics that 
underlies it within its very structures; technology, unlike the artifacts and processes of the 
ancients, thus appears to us to have a “logic of its own independent of the goals it serves.”24  
At core for him was the project of freeing this apparatus from the instrumentalist 
rationality that shaped it and from the “performance principle” that guided it.25 It had to be 
placed under the authority of another form of reason that would treat nature as something 
other than, in Heidegger’s terms, a “standing-reserve” of materials.26 It had to also treat 
humans as something other than a disposable army of labourers used—and equally 
discarded—for the means for production, distribution, and capitalist accumulation. Indeed, 
our technological inheritance, reworked under different values, could be central for cutting 
a different path for modernity under a “new reality principle.”27  
But what can Marcuse possibly mean by a “new reality principle,” and “another 
form of rationality”? Marcuse’s repositioning of the technological base depended on a 
“higher rationality” that would ground a technologically “transcendent project.” This 
project was threefold: via a negative dialectic mode of thinking and alternative social 
practices, it sought to, at the same time: 1) unveil the current state of domination, 2) 
problematize and “falsify” the “established reality,” and 3) demonstrate its own higher 
rationality by “preserving and improving” the achievements of modern civilization for 
reducing the hardships of survival in the struggle for existence. This last point for Marcuse 
was the actual accomplishment of modern civilization. But “preserving and improving” the 
achievements of modern civilization also meant the “pacification of existence” from its 
dysfunctional, perverse capture within the current technocratic framework—what Marcuse 
                                                
24 Feenberg, Heidegger and Marcuse, 98.  
25 Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 
156-157. 
26 Heidegger, “The Question,” 19. 
27 Marcuse, Eros, 223. 
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viewed as the catastrophe of modernity.28 Most fundamentally, the new rationality required 
the rending of reason away from modern science’s claims to value-neutrality.  
By An Essay on Liberation in 1969, the “total automation” of work and toil, for 
Marcuse, could potentially free us up to create “concrete alternatives” and practices,29 in a 
similar way that Marx proposes at the end of the Grundrisse: via “cooperation,” “self-
determination,” and “tenderness toward each other.”30 Technological processes would then 
be reapplied towards a “release of individual energy into a yet uncharted realm of freedom 
beyond necessity.”31  
 
The Ambivalence of Technology 
Feenberg has observed that Marcuse’s more hopeful view is rooted in his view that, 
despite its continued and serious socio-economic flaws, our technological inheritance is 
open to re-valuations and reworkings because of its inherent ambivalence.32 Feenberg tells 
us that technical systems are “ambivalent” in that they are perched between a multitude of 
possibilities. To think of technology as ambivalent means that we recognize that it is 
inscribed not only with the technical codes etched into it by its designers and implementers, 
but that it is also always re-inscribed by and within the social contexts and everyday 
applications of users. Technical activities thus operate in a tension between the intended 
outcomes of planners and the reinterpretation of those activities in the “margins of 
maneuver” available to users within technical spheres.33 In turn, these margins of 
maneuverability are the potential “germs of a new society.”34 Technological spheres are, 
despite the ideology of our age, already-always a “scene of struggle” and a “social 
battlefield,”35 where “class and power” determine “which of the ambivalent potentialities of 
the [technical] heritage will be realized.”36 Writes Feenberg:  
                                                
28 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 220. 
29 Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), 86. 
30 Marcuse, Liberation, 88-91. 
31 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 2 
32 Feenberg, Transforming Technology. 
33 Feenberg, Transforming Technology, 84-85. 
34 Feenberg, Transforming Technology, 87. 
35 Feenberg, Transforming Technology, 15. 
36 Feenberg, Transforming Technology, 53. 
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The theory of ambivalence resolves the dilemma opposing political realism and 
utopia by identifying the raw materials of socialism among the inheritances of 
capitalism. It asserts the possibility of bootstrapping from capitalism to socialism.37 
The ambivalence theory of technology, which Feenberg reads from a Hegelian-Marxian-
Weberian-Lukácian-Heideggerian Marcuse, is implicit throughout Marcuse’s analysis of 
our technological condition. It is, I argue, the key to unlocking his two-folded theory of 
technological rationality: its critical-diagnostic force and its efficaciousness for 
contemporary projects of technological reform and social change. Philosophically, 
Marcuse’s ambivalence theory of technology is rooted in the view that the tension within 
our technological condition is a class struggle (from Marx and Lukács), albeit one also 
informed by Heidegger’s phenomenological notion that Being is disclosed to us 
existentially as we engrain ourselves into the world in action—that is, as “being-in-the-
world.” As well, for Marcuse worldly engagement continued to reveal reality within 
dialectical processes that engaged the subject with the object in a movement from the given 
to something beyond it—the notion that all Being is a movement towards becoming (from 
Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel). Furthermore, the assumptions of capitalist logics, while 
tending to reify and totalize, are never total. Life remains porous; it can never be 
completely integrated into capitalist ends (from Weber and Lukács). As such, even 
technologically-mediated reality for Marcuse could still be, as it was for the ancients, open-
ended, subject to change, and beyond that which is given to mere appearance; potentiality is 
always just beyond mere technological appearance.  
In sum, the fundamental violence of modern formal reason for Marcuse is the 
“abstention from any judgment as to what is accidental and what essential.”38 This 
“abstention” is at the root of late-modern technological thinking. It places a formal 
rationality at the service of the status quo, privileging neutrality, scientific logic, 
abstraction, individualism, equivalencies, and productivism while canceling out all values 
and modes of thought sitting outside this status quo as neurotic, utopian, or irrational.39 In 
our technologically rationalized natural attitude, essentiality gives way to preferentiality, 
the sacred to the scientific, becoming to totality. 
                                                
37 Feenberg, Transforming Technology, 53 (emphasis his). 
38 Feenberg, Heidegger and Marcuse, 87. 




Marcuse’s Six Key Historical-Conjunctural Moments Prefiguring a “Post-
Technological Rationality” 
But how can Marcuse’s transcendent project for technology actually play out? How can 
freedom rest with technical progress? If it is the ideology of technical progress that 
enframes us so completely, how can it also liberate us? Indeed, how can we come to a 
technology of liberation? Marcuse had six key historical-conjunctural responses to these 
questions, scattered throughout his middle writings between the mid-1950s and early-
1970s. 
 
1. A reconstituted subjectivity is foundational for the redemption of technology 
The redemption of technology—i.e., a post-technological rationality of liberation—
would for Marcuse begin with a reconstituted subjectivity. This subject was to be a post-
Enlightenment one that overflowed working class identity and demands and struggled for 
desires within and outside of the workplace and onto the entire established society, akin to 
the political practices and demands of the radicalized New Left protagonists emerging on 
the political scene at the end of the 1960s. For Marcuse, according to Douglas Kellner, this 
reconstituted, re-radicalized subject also means “a bodily, erotic, gendered, social, and 
aestheticized subjectivity” that moves beyond the idealist-rationalist or all-knowing subject 
of modernity to one sensitive to other polymorphously eroticized modes of life.40 Having 
affinities in ways to the diffuse, de-centered, and discursive subjectivities of 
poststructuralism, this reconstituted subjectivity would be immersed in a “new 
sensibility”—i.e., a sensualized form of reason—emerging from individuals and groups 
practicing a “methodical disengagement and the refusal of the Establishment aiming at a 
radical transvaluation of values.”41 
 
2. Aesthetic practices 
For Marcuse, as for Adorno, art and artful ways of living possessed elements of 
“determinate negation” whereby the aesthetic dimension offers an oppositional force to the 
                                                
40 Douglas Kellner, “Marcuse and the Quest for Radical Subjectivity.” Dogma: Revue électronique (2000). 
http://dogma.free.fr/txt/Kellner-Marcuse01.htm (accessed March 28, 2007). 
41 Marcuse, Liberation, 6. 
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established society. With the unleashing of fantasy, “free play and even the folly of the 
imagination,” 42 Marcuse believed that the passionate, sensualized, joyful, and, yes, even 
utopian impulses of aesthetic and erotic practices would render the ugliness of 
contemporary, one-dimensional existence an offense to the “life instincts.” This was 
Marcuse’s “aesthetic reduction,” a mode of aesthetic critique that could “peel away” the 
offenses to the life-instincts inherent in contemporary modes of technologized life. 43 In 
other words, aestheticized reduction would strip away the immediate contingency of objects 
and societal conditions that arrest and contain a fuller potential of the stuff of the world and 
our experience of it.44  
 
3. The cultural and social practices of marginalized groups 
The cultural and social practices of marginalized groups also had oppositional (i.e., 
negational) power for Marcuse. Like aesthetic practices, marginal practices could also 
challenge the givens of the status quo and show us ways through to another world because 
both the aesthetic and the marginal operate on another plane of reason and imagination that 
place into relief the ugliness of established reality. For hints at a negation of the worst 
aspects of the practices of the advanced industrial system, Marcuse specifically looked to 
the radicalized subjectivities and practices emerging within the marginal groups of his 
lifetime, like avant garde artists, the cultural expressions emerging in the American ghetto, 
the new music of the 1960s, the American civil rights movement, the student protagonists 
of the May Events of ‘68, and the “historical advantage of the [colonized] late-comer.”45  
 
4. “External revolution” emanating from capital’s inherent moments of crises 
Moreover, “external revolution”46 —i.e., revolution affecting the metropoles from 
the exploited and the marginalized at the margins—could happen especially during 
moments where the late capitalist system started to come apart and crack due to its own 
propensity for crisis. By the mid to late 1960s, Marcuse had moved beyond his faith in a 
Leninist-Lukácsian vision of a vanguard party conscientizing the working class as the 
                                                
42 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 228. 
43 Feenberg, Heidegger and Marcuse, 93. 
44 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 239. 
45 Marcuse, Eros, xviii. 
46 Marcuse, Liberation, 82. 
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“subject of the revolution” that he had advocated previously.47 By the time he had 
completed writing An Essay on Liberation in May 1968, and especially during the 
immediate years after the French May Events, the catalyst for change for Marcuse that 
might be stimulated by such crises moments would be further driven by the cooperation 
and the solidarity of the dominated themselves, once they realized, out of their own 
practices and resistances, that crises could actually be openings for creating another 
world.48  
 
5. Determinate negation (or immanent critique) 
If I can anachronistically use contemporary poststructuralist language, for Marcuse, 
the moments of crisis inherent to capitalism due to its internal contradictions could be seen 
as offering opportunities for an immanent critique or, in Critical Theoretical parlance, a 
determinate negation, of the repressive, alienating, and exploitative nature of advanced 
capitalist systems. While contemporary poststructuralist theorists might distance 
themselves from the language of dialectics and “negation,” I believe nevertheless that there 
are important parallels between Marcuse’s theories of crisis and poststructuralist analyses 
of how alternative paths toward more ethico-political modes of life emerge immanently 
within and out of crises and struggle. For contemporary poststructuralist theorists such as 
Simon Critchley49 and Richard Day,50 the actual immanence of the bottom-up political 
responses of the newest, anti-globalization social justice movements that emerged in the 
1990s within and against “constituted” forms of power, and the situatedness and local-
nature of these struggles today, “both […] intervene against state and corporate power and 
prefigure, or [even] create, alternatives to the existing order.”51  
In close affinity with poststructuralist theories of immanent social struggles and 
change that emerges from within the multidimensional structures of power, by the late 
1960s Marcuse also believed that the socio-political alternatives being experimented with 
by the New Left and other social movements of the ‘60s had a two-folded interventional 
                                                
47 Feenberg & Leiss, Essential Marcuse, xxvii. 
48 Marcuse, Liberation, 88-91. 
49 Simon Critchley, Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance (London: Verso, 
2007). 
50 Richard Day, Gramsci is Dead: Anarchist Currents in the Newest Social Movements (New York: Pluto 
Press, 2005). 
51 Day, Gramsci is Dead, 19. 
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and prefigurative force. By 1969, Marcuse was theorizing how struggles “from below” had 
the potential force to be both a determinate negation of status-quo forms of power, as well 
as the ability to concretely revalorize and reconstruct the technologically mediated 
structures of life.52 53 Indeed, these visions for a post-technological society are, I argue, 
comparable to poststructural theories of the prefigurative politics immanent to current, anti-
neoliberal and alternative socio-political practices.  
 
6. The “contagion” of bottom-up struggle 
Such spontaneous, decentralized, and diffuse bottom-up struggle—from below or, 
as Marcuse termed it, the “subversive grass roots”—could stimulate a “contagion,”54 
contributing to potentially emancipative networks of post-technological movements of 
workers’ control, cooperatives, student revolt, and various other struggles of the 
marginalized.55 Thus, “disruption at one key place,” wrote Marcuse, “can easily lead to a 
serious [contagious] dysfunctioning of the whole.”56 
As autonomist Marxists theorize, in partial synchrony with Marcuse while taking 
their cue from poststructuralist political theory, “crisis is, from the point of view of the 
working-class subject, a moment not of breakdown but of breakthrough.”57 Crisis and the 
events they spawn, for these thinkers, as for Marcuse, are openings for the class struggle 
that show “other possibilities for living” while, at the same time, putting into relief the 
obscenity, perversity, and contradictions of capital.58 In a similar tone to current 
poststructuralist and autonomist Marxist political theory, Marcuse wrote in An Essay on 
Liberation that  
the strength of the moral [and]…operational values […] is likely to wear off under 
the impact of the growing contradictions within the society. The result would be 
[…] resistance to work, refusal to perform, negligence, indifference—factors of 
                                                
52 Marcuse, Liberation, 87. 
53 Herbert Marcuse, Counter-Revolution and Revolt (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), 44-46.  
54 Marcuse, Counter-Revolution, 42. 
55 Marcuse, Counter-Revolution, 43-47. 
56 Marcuse, Counter-Revolution, 43. 
57 Peter Bell & Harry Cleaver, “Marx’s Theory of Crisis as Theory of Class Struggle.” The Commoner, 5, 
(2002): 1-59. http://www.commoner.org.uk/cleaver05.pdf (accessed December 8, 2007), 58-59 (emphasis 
theirs). 
58 Maurizzio Lazzarato, “Struggle, Event, Media.” RepublicArt, May (2003). 
http://republicart.net/disc/representations/lazzarato01_en.htm (accessed May 3, 2006), par. 3. 
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dysfunction which would hit a highly centralized and coordinated apparatus, where 
breakdown at one point may easily affect large sections of the whole.59 
Out of crisis moments, then, from the margins, and through cultural practices saturated in 
polymorphously re-eroticized and aesthicized rationality, technological life could be re-
articulated, and re-invented. Marcuse’s descriptions of the possible forms that a post-
technologically rationalized life could take echo many of the newest social movements’ 
contemporary experiments with horizontalized, non-monogamic, de-individualized, re-
communalized, and anti-capitalist forms of subjectivity, work processes, and social 
organization. Indeed, Marcuse’s own words could be used to accurately describe some of 
the contemporary socio-political practices of the newest social movements: in Marcuse’s 
Counter-Revolution and Revolt, written in 1972, we see him provisionally theorizing 
practices such as directly democratic social experiments60 (as political but perhaps not 
necessarily economic power from below) and workers’ control (as economic but perhaps 
not necessarily political power from below).61 From his earlier An Essay on Liberation, we 
read of his hopes for practices of “solidarity and cooperation,” “autonomy,” and “self-
determination.”62 And, from 1955’s Eros and Civilization, we see evidence of how people 
can aspire towards the negation of the “Profit and Performance Principle” more generally63 
via the automization of labour and the privileging of imagination, fantasy, and play over 
work and toil.64 Ultimately, for Marcuse, the “performance principle” (alienated labour) can 
be libidinally reconstituted into a non-surplus repressive, Eros-laden, and life-affirming 
reality principle where play and work would themselves be reconciled and fused under a 
new order not subject to “administration” by “rational routine” or the “mastery instinct.”65 
 
Marcuse’s Post-Technological Rationality in Light of Contemporary Struggles 
Against Neoliberal Rationality 
The worldwide alter-globalization and social justice movements are providing 
countless examples of how alternative cultural expressions and Marcusean-like post-
                                                
59 Marcuse, Liberation, 84 (emphasis mine). 
60 Marcuse, Counter-Revolution, 45. 
61 Marcuse, Counter-Revolution, 43. 
62 Marcuse, Liberation, 88. 
63 Marcuse, Eros, 83-90. 
64 Marcuse, Eros, 193. 
65 Marcuse, Eros, 218-219. 
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technological modes of life and thought can emerge from out of the myriad moments of 
crisis neoliberal capital is susceptible to.66 The bottom-up responses to these crises can be 
seen as upholding rematerialized Marcusean values of love, joy, resistance, and direct 
democracy as a way of both immanently countering the neoliberal enclosures of life and, at 
the same time, re-inventing present social institutions from below, prefiguring and 
projecting the potentiality for another world. As such, the “newest social movements”67 are 
beginning to offer viable alternatives to, and communal freedom from, neoliberal forms of 
oppression and exclusion. 
Today, for example, in response to the growing commodification and 
hierarchialization of formal education throughout the neoliberal world, individuals and 
collectives are getting involved in critical readings groups and alternative, popular 
educational projects akin to Marcuse’s vision for the creation of “free universities”68 to 
facilitate the emergence of newly radicalized forms of social actors and subjectivities.69 
These critical education initiatives encourage participants to critically pause from the 
hullabaloo and consumer hype of late (post)modern life in order to reflect on, seek out, 
create, and share—negationally, proactively, cooperatively, and prefiguratively—how to 
act on the revelations for social change that emerge out of moments of crisis and critical 
thought. They think from within and beyond the vantage point of our current, globalized 
neoliberal enclosures while, at the same time, endeavouring to create new commons via 
alternative spaces for community gatherings and individual contemplation outside of the 
enclosures of private property, the marketplace, and the profit motive. Furthermore, their 
collective practices are often rooted in notions of mutual aid, non-commodified interaction 
and exchange, cooperativism and affinity groupings, the aesthetics of community music 
                                                
66 Such crises of neoliberalism in the past decade or so have included: the Southeast Asian and Latin 
American financial crises of the late 20th and early 21st centuries, the US-led “war on terror” and its 
connections to control of energy resources and global capital, the US real estate and sub-prime mortgage 
crisis of 2008-9, the growing IMF-sponsored trend of privatization, the informalization and casualization of 
working life and workers’ resistances against these trends in Europe, etc. 
67 Day, Gramsci is Dead, 8. 
68 Marcuse, Counter-Revolution, 56. 
69 For example, see: Vancouver, B.C.’s Critical U’s community-led, non-credit course development and 
offerings rooted in the concept of “utopian pedagogy”; Toronto’s Anarchist Free University’s activist-
oriented and non-university credit course offerings; Toronto School of Creativity & Inquiry’s event series and 
reading groups focused on communal projects of counter-cartography and studying concepts and practices 
that move beyond the neoliberal enclosures of life; or Universidad Trashumante, a team of activist educators 
traveling in a reconfigured bus throughout Argentina’s hinterland offering critical pedagogical and 
community educational opportunities to marginalized communities. 
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initiatives and participatory art, and other modes of sociality that experiment with 
polymorphously erotic and non-monogamic social bonds.70 Moreover, they are inventors of 
spaces for breathing, for thinking through and actually creating alternatives to—in 
Marcuse’s language—the surplus repressive status quo despite the intractable presence of 
hierarchically organized and commodified life that surrounds them. And not surprisingly 
they are, in the process of this thoughtful inventiveness, discovering life-affirming ways of 
unleashing new possibilities—more humane possibilities—for re-engaging with the world, 
provisioning for their needs, for satisfying their desires, and for organizing their lives in 
non-commercialized ways. 
 
Other forms of contemporary re-rationalized technological modes of life that hint at 
Marcuse’s “transcendent project” more sensitive to the affirmation of life are: the countless 
actions of property takeovers and land squattings by landless and indigenous groups and 
overly exploited workers around the world, the autonomously based and collectively run 
Italian social centres, the landless peasant and worker-recuperated enterprise movements 
taking flight across South America, 71 guerrilla and rooftop gardeners in the urban Global 
North, North American farmers’ markets, co-housing and intentional communities in 
Europe and Canada, and the global-social justice movement more broadly brought together 
by the World Social Forum.72 These movements are seeing the marginalized, the poor, the 
exploited, the landless, and the dispossessed reorganizing and revaluating notions of land, 
property, democracy, housing, work, labour processes, cultural production, and spaces for 
play in ways that subvert and negate the ideology of private property, technologism, 
                                                
70 For example, see: Toronto’s Abandonment Issues, an initiative using local community knowledge and 
experience in the struggle to force city hall to expropriate abandoned buildings for the city’s homeless; New 
York City’s 16 Beaver Collective, an ongoing and emergent collective of radical artists involved in critical 
reading groups, innovative event-based interventions, and collaborative art experiments; Toronto’s Entangled 
Territories, an experiment in raising awareness of and producing collective cognition towards transforming 
and reclaiming urban spaces from the enclosures of neoliberalism and the capitalist state; or Los Angeles’s 
Critical Spatial Practices/Just Spaces, a traveling artist exhibition and programming endevour looking into 
more “just” reclamations and reinventions of urban spaces.  
71 Marcelo Vieta & Andrés Ruggeri, “The Worker-Recovered Enterprises as Workers’ Cooperatives: The 
Conjunctures, Challenges, and Innovations of Self-Management in Argentina and Latin America,” in Co-
operatives in a Global Economy: The Challenges of Co-operation Across Borders, edited by J.J. McMurtry & 
Daryl Reed, 178-225 (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009). 
72 Other examples of these types of initiatives that come to mind include Canada’s Ontario Coalition Against 




progressivism, consumerism, individualism, top-down management, coercion, and 
productivism in favour of communal property, cooperation, affinity, the refusal of work, 
democratized labour processes, mutual aid, and the respect of human beings’ differences 
and myriad capacities beyond detail work. Further, the privileging of capitalist workplaces, 
consumer culture, and private spaces as the only arenas for legitimate creativity are effaced 
in the practices of these communally focused, cooperatively organized, and intentionally 
created communities.  
The “irresistibility” for these newest social movements to not only reactively resist 
global capital and the neoliberal enclosures, but also to proactively seek out and re-invent 
alternative forms of technologically mediated life, can be seen as modeling Marcuse’s 
Nietzschean call for aspiring to a “different experience of the world”73 through a “new 
basic experience of Being,”74 “being-as-end-in-itself [,] as joy (Lust) and enjoyment.”75 All 
are engrained with, Marcuse might further add, “pleasurable co-operation,” “attractive 
labor,” and the “release” of creative and “libidinal forces.”76 And all lead towards, and are 
undergirded by, an alternative techno-logy of liberation rather than domination, a 




These newest social movements are just a few contemporary examples of how, in 
post-technologically rationalized moments, logos and eros, nature and human life, and our 
search for the reduction of toil in light of our continued needs to provision for our 
necessities in a world of limited resources can be immanently reconciled with our 
technological inheritance within our particular historical conjuncture and cultural contexts. 
These practices, I have been arguing, have affinities with a Marcusean ethics of caring for 
nature and for the other as another subject full of difference and potentiality. Furthermore, 
they are undergirding new rational and technological paradigms. For these practices show 
us how we can both immanently (re)invent and prefigure new technological and 
                                                
73 Marcuse, Eros, 216. 
74 Marcuse, Eros, 158. 
75 Marcuse, Eros, 121-122. 
76 Marcuse, Eros, 217. 
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organizational realities rooted in social values striving for the pacification of existence. 
Through such reconciliations, akin to the struggle to reconcile a new logos with a new eros, 
we can collaboratively forge a new mode of sensual and affectual life, framing society’s 
very techniques with new means and new ends sympathetic to the affirmation of life. In 
other words, regardless of the continued existence of global capital and the neoliberal 
enclosures of life, the enframing logic of late-modern technologies of control can be—and 
are—contained and reappropriated by myriad groups from below as they seize the 
technological inheritance and override it via new values and new socialized applications, 
i.e., the legislation of new values.  
In sum, out of Marcuse’s own theoretical moves beyond his substantivist 
counterparts, as I mapped out earlier in this essay, it is clear that the critique of the 
technological rationality of advanced capitalism cannot be “mere ideological ‘reflection’ 
for then,” as Feenberg writes, technological reform “would have neither technical efficacy 
nor truth value.”77 For Marcuse, social transformation and, indeed, even civilizational 
change, can be accessed via the other side of progress because technological progress 
contains within it the possibility of unleashing a “truth” to existence that “presupposes” a 
freedom from human toil, material necessity, exploitation, and domination.78 
                                                
77 Feenberg, Heidegger and Marcuse, 100. 
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